Category: 97:2

Much recent work in academic literature and policy discussions suggests that the proliferation of actuarial—meaning statistical—assessments of a defendant’s recidivism risk in state sentencing structures is problematic. Yet scholars and policymakers focus on changes in technology over time while ignoring the effects of these tools on society. This Article shifts the focus away from technology to society in order to reframe debates. It asserts that sentencing technologies subtly change key social concepts that shape punishment and society. These same conceptual transformations preserve problematic features of the sociohistorical phenomenon of mass incarceration. By connecting technological interventions and conceptual transformations, this Article exposes an obscured threat posed by the proliferation of risk tools as sentencing reform. As sentencing technologies transform sentencing outcomes, the tools also alter society’s language and concerns about punishment. Thus, actuarial risk tools as technological sentencing reform not only excise society’s deeper issues of race, class, and power from debates. The tools also strip society of a language to resist the status quo by changing notions of justice along the way.

Conventionally, customary international law is developed through the actions and beliefs of nations. International treaties are interpreted, in part, by assessing how the parties to the treaty behave. This Article observes that these forms of uncodified international law—custom and subsequent treaty practice—are also developed through a nation’s reactions, or failures to react, to acts and beliefs that can be attributed to it. I call this “attributed lawmaking.”

Consider the new commercial space race. Innovators like SpaceX and Blue Origin seek a permissive legal environment. A Cold-War-era treaty does not seem adequately to address contemporary plans for space. The treaty does, however, attribute private sector activity to nations. The theory of attributed lawmaking suggests that the attribution renders the activity of private actors in space relevant to the development of binding international legal rules. As a doctrinal matter, private activity that is attributed to the state becomes “state practice” for the purpose of treaty interpretation or customary international law formation. Moreover, as a matter of realpolitik, private actors standing in the shoes of the state can force states into a reactive posture, easing the commercially preferred rules into law through the power of inertia and changes to the status quo. Attributed lawmaking is not a new phenomenon but it may have increasing significance at a time when multilateral lawmaking is at an ebb, lines between public and private entities are blurring, and the question of attribution becomes both more complex and more urgent.

There is a broad consensus in the criminal justice community that our criminal statutes are a mess: They are imprecise, overly broad, and overly punitive. Legislatures write these laws because there are significant political incentives for them to be “tough on crime” and few incentives for them to write carefully crafted laws. The problems of over-criminalization thus seem to be both a predictable yet intractable consequence of the incentives that legislatures face. But this Article offers a novel solution: Judges should develop new clear statement rules to interpret criminal statutes. The Supreme Court has created clear statement rules to protect important values, such as federalism and the separation of powers. Legislatures can overcome those values, but only if they do so affirmatively and unambiguously. Just as existing clear statement rules protect important structural values, new criminal clear statement rules would protect important criminal justice values. Unless statutes clearly state that they reject those values, clear statement rules will result in statutory interpretations that better protect the interests of criminal defendants. The result will be clearer and more thoughtful criminal laws—both because legislatures will write better statutes and because judges will construe poorly drafted statutes in a more narrow and predictable manner. In addition to making the case for criminal clear statement rules as a general interpretive tool, this Article proposes two specific clear statement rules. One rule would create a default presumption of a knowing mental state requirement for material elements. The other would impose a substantial harm requirement. Both would markedly improve the state of modern criminal law.

The legal profession is losing its authority over the regulation of legal services. Recent changes in antitrust law have put state bar associations under a spotlight. Competition from technology companies and concerns about access to justice have increased political pressure for market liberalization. Independent research is challenging the unique value of lawyers’ services, even in formal legal proceedings, and this research is increasingly well-organized and well-funded at the national level. The organized bar is asleep at the wheel and ill-prepared to respond.

This Article argues that the United States is moving toward evidence-based lawyer regulation, and suggests strategies for equipping the bar to contribute to evidence-based policy-making. It focuses specifically on strategies for institutionalizing  independent research norms within the profession and promoting research as an essential component of professional self-regulation.