The doctrine of separation of powers is a basic tenet ofAmerican jurisprudence. This Symposium probes into its ongoing vitality in shaping contemporary legal and public policy issues. The following is a documentation of the Federalist Society Conference entitled “The Presidency and Congress: Constitutionally Separated and Shared Powers” held on January 19 and 20, 1990 at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C.
William Barr, Louis Fisher, Edwin Meese III, Geoffrey P. Miller and Kate Stith
We are going to talk about some of the coercive aspects that the Constitution, in a sense, gives to the Congress, because there are some constitutional powers given to the Congress which directly relate to how the executive branch does its job.
Stephen Carter, Kenneth Culp Davis and Kenneth Starr
In the arena of separation of powers, courts have at times shown discomfort similar to that evident in the sometimes articulated fears of entering the thicket of political questions. Notwithstanding the apparent discomfort, however, courts have tended not to back away from deciding separation-of-powers questions.
Stephen Breyer, Terry Eastland, E. Donald Elliot and Laurence Silberman
I shall argue that we must separate two important issues: the first, “separation of powers,” raises issues of constitutional law; and the second, “Presidential control of agency decision making,” raises issues of fair and effective government.
Chuck will speak this morning on “random constitutional thoughts with some particular bellyaching about the budget process.” Without further comment I present to you the co-chairman of this conference, Senator Charles S. Robb.
In my view, you measure the success or failure of government, not by the volume of legislation that it generates, but by whatever increment of good it adds to human welfare, or as is typically the case, by the relatively small level of harm it inflicts upon social institutions. The correct way to look at things is with the strong presumption that the more legislation you have, the worse that…
Frank Easterbrook, Theodore Olson, Steven Ross and David Schoenbrod
My topic is the delegation of legislative power which occurs when a statute authorizes the Executive to make the rules of conduct. My purpose is to urge you to begin to rethink whether this prevalent practice is a wise and good thing.
Federalists, I give you the former six-term congressman from Wyoming, the former Chief of Staff to President Ford, and the individual who, as much as anyone in Congress, made Gorbachev the man he is today-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.